

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 OSLO 03506 01 OF 05 240749Z

ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00
INR-10 NSAE-00 AID-05 ACDA-12 HA-05 EB-08 TRSE-00
OMB-01 H-01 /082 W
-----034968 240916Z /11

R 240620Z JUL 78

FM AMEMBASSY OSLO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6188

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

JCS WASHDC

CSA WASHDC

CNO WASHDC

CSAF WASHDC

CMC WASHDC

/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

DISAM WP AFB OH

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 OSLO 3506

FROM ODC

USCINCEUR FOR ECJ4/7-SA

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, NO

SUBJECT: SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

REFS: A) SECSTATE WASHDC 167901 DTG 010215Z JUL 78; B) SECSTATE
WASHDC 168320 DTG 031928Z JUL 78; C) USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE/
ECJ4/7-SA 071545Z JUL 78; D) USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE/ECJ4/7-SA
131635Z JUL 78

1. NORWAY IS ONE OF AMERICA'S CLOSEST FRIENDS AND ALLIES WITH
INNUMERABLE TIES OF HISTORY, FAMILY, COMMERCE AND SECURITY.
IT IS ALSO ONE OF THE WEALTHIEST COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD. IN
TERMS OF PER CAPITA GNP (US \$8860), IT RANKS EITHER ONE OR TWO.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 OSLO 03506 01 OF 05 240749Z

ITS OIL RESOURCES ARE EXPECTED TO BEGIN GENERATING INCOME
ON THE ORDER OF \$7 BILLION BY THE MID 1980'S. ITS
CITIZENS ENJOY ONE OF THE WORLD'S HIGHEST STANDARDS
OF LIVING. ALL OF WHICH EXPLAINS THE FACT THAT NORWAY
IS NOT A RECIPIENT OF GRANT MILITARY ASSISTANCE NOR FMS CREDITS
OR IMET. SHE PAYS CASH FOR WHAT HER SMALLSTANDING MILITARY
REQUIRES. THEREFORE, THE ORCHESTRATION OF U.S. MILITARY

ASSISTANCE TO NORWAY TO ACHIEVE U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES IS NOT ONLY UNNECESSARY BUT IMPOSSIBLE.

2. ICW REFERENCES THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED IN FORMAT AS OUTLINED IN REF A.

3. A. (1) (S) NORWAY IS A MAJOR STRATEGIC INTEREST TO THE U.S. AND NATO BECAUSE IT IS ADJACENT TO THE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT SOVIET AIR/NAVAL BASE COMPLEXES ON THE KOLA PENINSULA WHERE MUCH OF THE USSR'S SLBM CAPABILITY IS LOCATED. THE SHORTEST TRAJECTORY BETWEEN KOLA AND THE USA PASSES OVER NORWAY. NORWAY'S LOCATION CAN PROVIDE BASES FROM WHICH TO OBSERVE AND INTERDICT THE SEA AND AIR ROUTES USED BY SOVIET FORCES TRANSITING TO AND FROM THE NORTH SEA, BALTIC, THE ICELAND/UK/FAEROES GAP AND THE ATLANTIC. IN ADDITION, ITS NORTH SEA OIL FIELDS PROVIDE A POTENTIAL ALTERNATE SOURCE OF OIL FOR WESTERN EUROPE. AT THE SAME TIME THE NORWEGIAN OIL COULD SIMILARLY APPEAL TO THE SOVIET UNION EITHER AS A SOURCE OR A TARGET. IN VIEW OF THIS STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE THE FOLLOWING SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED:

(A) GENERAL.

(1. SUPPORT MODERNIZATION OF THE NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES TO IMPROVE QUALITY AND DENSITY OF NATO DEFENSES.

(2. ENCOURAGE ACQUISITION OF SUPPLIES, EQUIPMENT AND WAR RESERVE STOCK TO MEET NATO PRESCRIBED LEVELS.

(3. ADVOCATE ATTAINMENT OF ACE FORCE PROPOSALS AND NATO SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 OSLO 03506 01 OF 05 240749Z

FORCE GOALS.

(4. SUPPORT ACQUISITION OF SUFFICIENT WEAPONRY SO AS TO PERMIT A MORE EFFECTIVE DELAYING ACTION UNTIL THE ARRIVAL OF NATO REINFORCEMENTS.

(5. SUPPORT PROGRAMS THAT WILL ENHANCE NORWAY'S ARMS INDUSTRY CAPACITY/CAPABILITY.

(B) ARMY.

(1. ENCOURAGE WAR RESERVE MATERIEL STOCKS IN ACCORDANCE WITH NATO LEVELS.

(2. SUPPORT ACQUISITION OF ADDITIONAL LIGHT WHEELED AND OVERSNOW VEHICLES TO ENHANCE TACTICAL MOBILITY AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

(3. SUPPORT IMPROVEMENTS TO TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY.

(4. SUPPORT PROCUREMENT OF MODERN ANTI-TANK WEAPONS TO MEET NATO REQUIREMENTS FOR TRAINING, OPERATIONAL AND WAR RESERVE.

(C) NAVY.

(1. SUPPORT ACQUISITION OF MISSILE-EQUIPPED FAST PATROL BOATS TO IMPROVE DEFENSE OF NORWEGIAN SEA FRONTIER, COASTAL SHIPPING AND OFFSHORE OIL INSTALLATIONS.

(2. SUPPORT MODIFICATIONS TO P-3B AIRCRAFT TO ENHANCE

ASW CAPABILITY.

(3. ENCOURAGE REPLACING CONVERTED U.S. RAVEN-CLASS MINELAYING VESSELS WITH NEW/IMPROVED UNITS.

(4. ENCOURAGE REPLACEMENT OF GERMAN BUILT KOBLEN SUBMARINES WITH A NEW CLASS SUBMARINE.

(5. ENCOURAGE PROVISIONING ADDITIONAL WAS RESERVE STOCKS OF POL, TORPEDOES AND AMMUNITION TO MEET NATO STANDARDS.

(6. ENCOURAGE DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVED PENGUIN MISSILE FROM SURFACE-TO-SHIP, AS WELL AS FAST PATROL BOATS TO ENHANCE COASTAL DEFENSE CAPABILITY.

(7. WORK TO IMPROVE NAVY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS TO INSURE SUFFICIENT JUNIOR OFFICERS AND CAREER TECHNICIANS TO CREW ALL VESSELS.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 OSLO 03506 02 OF 05 240809Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00
INR-10 NSAE-00 AID-05 ACDA-12 HA-05 EB-08 TRSE-00
OMB-01 H-01 /082 W
-----035056 240917Z /20

R 240620Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6189
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
CSA WASHDC
CNO WASHDC
CSAF WASHDC
CMC WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
DISAM WP AFB OH

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 5 OSLO 3506

FROM ODC

USCINCEUR FOR ECJ4/7-SA

(D) AIR FORCE.

(1. SUPPORT PROCUREMENT OF F-16 TO REPLACE F-104'S AND SOME F-5 AIRCRAFT, AND TO SUPPORT EXPANSION OF AIR FORCE, THUS ENHANCING TACTICAL AND AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY.

(2. SUPPORT ACQUISITION OF ROLAND AND AIM-9L MISSILE TO IMPROVE AIR DEFENSE SURFACE-TO-AIR CAPABILITIES.

(3. ENCOURAGE IMPROVEMENTS TO THE AIRCRAFT CONTROL AND WARNING SYSTEM THAT WOULD ENHANCE LOW DETECTION CAPABILITY AND INCREASE THE POINT OF SATURATION.

(4. ENCOURAGE ACQUISITION OF AMMUNITION AND MISSILES SUFFICIENT TO MEET THE NATO ESTABLISHED WRM REQUIREMENTS.

(5. WORK TO INSURE ADEQUATE PILOTS AND TECHNICIANS ARE MAINTAINED ON ACTIVE DUTY.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 OSLO 03506 02 OF 05 240809Z

3. A. (2) (S) THE TREAT - EXTERNAL:

NORWAY HAS A VERY ACUTE PERCEPTION OF THE SOVIET THREAT TO ITS NORTHERN BORDERS. THIS PERCEPTION IS BASED ON THE INCREASING DEPLOYMENTS AND UPGRADING OF SOVIET CONVENTIONAL AND STRATEGIC FORCES ON THE ADJACENT KOLA PENINSULA. NORWAY FORESEES ITS TERRITORY AS HAVING INCREASING UTILITY TO SOVIET STRATEGIC NEEDS, WHICH CONSIST OF DEFENSIVE PROTECTION FOR SLBM AND SLBM DISPERSAL SITES IN TIMES OF CRISIS, ATTACKING ANY ALLIED BASES AND PRESENCE IN NORTH NORWAY WHICH COULD THREATEN THE USSR AND THE POTENTIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR FORWARD AIR BASES IN NORTH NORWAY TO EXTEND THE RANGE OF SOVIET AIRCRAFT UNITS TO NORWEGIAN AND ATLANTIC OCEANS. NORWAY WOULD FEEL EVEN MORE THREATENED WITHOUT U.S. AND NATO BACKING.

NORWAY ALSO PERCEIVES A PRESENT SOVIET THREAT TO ITS SIGNIFICANT OIL AND FISHERIES RESOURCES IN THE ARCTIC AREAS. THE DELINEATION OF NATIONAL CLAIMS, ACCESS, AND CONTROLS NECESSARY FOR EXPLOITATION OF NORWAY'S ECONOMIC INTEREST IS RESISTED BY THE USSR, WHICH IS INTENT ON SECURING MAXIMUM SECURITY AS WELL AS ECONOMIC BENEFITS FOR ITSELF.

THE THREAT - INTERNAL:

THE INTERNAL THREAT IS NEGLIGIBLE. AT PRESENT THE MAJOR ACTIVITY OF THE RADICAL/LEFTIST GROUPS AFFECTING THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT IS A CONTINUING PROGRAM TO DISRUPT MILITARY LIFE BY INFILTRATING--THROUGH LEGAL ELECTIONS--THE SERVICEMEN'S TILLITSMANN ORGANIZATION (TO). STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES IN THE TO, BASICALLY A CONSCRIPT WELFARE SCHEME, HAVE FACILITATED A MEASURE OF INTERNAL RADICAL ACTIVITY. FAILURE TO ATTRACT BROAD CONSCRIPT SUPPORT--EXCEPT ON BREAD-AND-BUTTER ISSUES SUCH AS PAY, LEAVE, ETC.--PLUS CAUTIOUS GOVERNMENT MOVES TO CRACK DOWN SEEM TO HAVE GREATLY LIMITED THE IMPACT OF SUCH EFFORTS.

3. A. (3) (S) TYPE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT NORWAY BELIEVES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 OSLO 03506 02 OF 05 240809Z

SUITED TO MEET THE COUNTRY'S REQUIREMENTS AND THE THREAT:
NORWAY SIGNED THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY IN 1949 AND HER PRESENT

DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND POLICY IS BASED ON THIS MEMBERSHIP. GREAT IMPORTANCE IS ATTACHED TO THE PEACETIME PREPARATIONS DEEMED NECESSARY FOR THE RECEPTION OF REINFORCEMENTS TO NORTHERN NORWAY. NORWEGIAN DEFENSE POLICY IS COMMITTED TO A POLICY OF QUOTE TOTAL DEFENSE UNQUOTE WHEREIN THE ENTIRE POPULATION CONTRIBUTES AS REQUIRED. STEPS TO IMPLEMENT THE TOTAL DEFENSE CONCEPT HAVE BEEN TAKEN THROUGH PLANNING, ORGANIZATION, PREPARATIONS AND TRAINING, BOTH IN THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SECTORS. ONE OF THE MAIN TASKS OF THE NON-MILITARY DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS IS TO SUPPORT THE MILITARY DEFENSE TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE. THEREFORE, THE CHIEF OF DEFENSE HAS BOTH THE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE AUTHORITY TO SUPERVISE THE EMERGENCY PLANNING OF THE NON-MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS.

NORWAY'S DEFENSE POLICY IS SHAPED BY ITS GEOGRAPHIC POSITION BORDERING A KEY STRATEGIC AREA OF THE SOVIET UNION, BY A DETERMINATION TO BLOCK LIMITED SOVIET ATTACKS WHILE RELYING ON ALLIED REINFORCEMENTS, BY A RECOGNITION THAT NORWAY IS NOT ABLE SINGLY TO MAINTAIN MILITARY POWER BALANCE IN THE NORTH AND THEREFORE NEEDS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE LARGER STRUCTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, AND BY A DESIRE TO PURSUE THE TWIN OBJECTIVES OF DETERRENCE AND REASSURANCE IN THE SENSITIVE NORTHERN REGIONS.

UNDER NORWEGIAN LAW, EVERY MALE CITIZEN WHO IS PHYSICALLY AND MENTALLY FIT IS SUBJECT TO MILITARY CONSCRIPTION AT THE AGE OF 19 UNTIL AGE 44. ACTUAL CALL-UP TAKES PLACE--ON THE AVERAGE--AT AGE 19. THE LENGTH OF COMPULSORY SERVICE IS AS FOLLOWS: ARMY, 12 MONTHS; NAVY, 15 MONTHS (COAST ARTILLERY, 12 MONTHS); AND AIR FORCE, 15 MONTHS (AAA UNITS, 12 MONTHS).

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 OSLO 03506 03 OF 05 240826Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00
INR-10 NSAE-00 AID-05 ACDA-12 HA-05 EB-08 TRSE-00
OMB-01 /081 W

-----035125 240918Z /20

R 240620Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6190
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
CSA WASHDC
CNO WASHDC
CSAF WASHDC

CMC WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
DISAM WP AFB OH

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 5 OSLO 3506

FROM ODC

USCINCEUR FOR ECJ4/7-SA

THE NUMBER OF CONSCRIPTS CALLED UP YEARLY FOR NATIONAL SERVICE TO FILL THE PEACETIME ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES IS ON AN AVERAGE 22,000 MEN. FOLLOWING DISCHARGE, EACH CONSCRIPT IS LIABLE TO A PERIOD OF RESERVE SERVICE AND WILL REMAIN AVAILABLE TO THE MILITARY DEFENSE FORCES UP TO THE AGE OF 45. AFTER DISCHARGE FROM INITIAL SERVICE, THE SOLDIER IS TRANSFERRED TO A MOBILIZATION UNIT NEAR HIS HOME WHERE AN ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT WILL KEEP HIM ON RECORD AS LONG AS HE IS LIABLE TO MILITARY SERVICE. UNTIL AGE 34, HE WILL NORMALLY BE ASSIGNED TO A MOBILE FIELD UNIT--OR OTHER FIRST PRIORITY UNIT. FROM AGE 35 TO 44, HE IS AVAILABLE FOR THE LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES. AFTER AGE 45 THE INDIVIDUAL HAS NO OBLIGATIONS IN PEACETIME AS FAR AS MILITARY SERVICE IS CONCERNED; HOWEVER, HE MAY VOLUNTEER
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 OSLO 03506 03 OF 05 240826Z

TO SERVE IN THE HOME GUARD OR CIVIL DEFENSE.
THE OVERALL PEACETIME STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES IS APPROXIMATELY 36,000 MEN, OF WHICH 25 PERCENT ARE REGULARS, THE REMAINDER ARE CONSCRIPTS SERVING ON THEIR COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE.
THE NORWEGIAN ARMY IS BASICALLY A MOBILIZATION FORCE BUILT AROUND AN ACTIVE DUTY STRENGTH OF 17,000 OFFICERS AND MEN OF WHICH 25 PERCENT ARE REGULARS. THE ACTIVE COMBAT FORCE CONSISTS OF ONE BRIGADE (OF THREE INFANTRY BATTALIONS) AND THREE SEPARATE INFANTRY BATTALIONS--INCLUDING THE KING'S GUARD. THE INFANTRY BRIGADE (BRIGADE NORTH) IS LOCATED IN NORTHERN NORWAY (AS ARE TWO OF THE SEPARATE BATTALIONS). UPON FULL MOBILIZATION, THE GROUND FORCES WILL EXPAND TO A TOTAL OF 13 COMBINED REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAMS. THESE ORGANIZATIONS WILL HAVE ORGANIC COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT. FULL ARMY PLANNED MOBILIZATION BY M-3 IS 135,000 MEN.
THE ROYAL NORWEGIAN NAVY IS INTENDED PRIMARILY FOR CLOSE DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY'S SEA FRONTIER, PARTICULARLY AGAINST AMPHIBIOUS ATTACK IN THE NORTH, AND PROTECTION OF COASTAL SHIPPING. THE FLEET CONSISTS OF 4 FFG, 1 FF, 15 SS, 2 PC, 6 PTG, 20 PGMG, 20 PT, 3 MMC, 10 MSC, 8 LCU AND 11 AUXILIARIES AND SERVICE CRAFT. THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF THE NAVY IS APPROXIMATELY 9,000 OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN INCLUDING 1,900 COASTAL ARTILLERY MEN WHO HAVE BEEN INTEGRATED INTO THE NAVY.

THE ROYAL AIR FORCE CONSISTS OF APPROXIMATELY 10,000 OFFICERS AND MEN AND HAS AN INVENTORY OF SOME 225 AIRCRAFT. THE MISSIONS OF THE AIR FORCE ARE TO DEFEND NORWEGIAN AIRSPACE, PROVIDE TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT FOR GROUND DEFENSE, TRANSPORT AND SAR OPERATIONS.

THE HOME GUARD IS A RESERVE PARAMILITARY FORCE THAT WOULD BE ACTIVATED WITHIN FOUR HOURS IN WAR TIME. TOTAL STRENGTH WOULD BE APPROXIMATELY 75,000 MEN, WITH 66,000 TO THE ARMY,

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 OSLO 03506 03 OF 05 240826Z

THE REMAINDER TO THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE.

3. (5) (S) ASSESSMENT OF THE FORCES, DISCUSSED IN PARA

(4) ABOVE:

OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS THE STRENGTH OF THE NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES HAS REMAINED RELATIVELY STABLE AT ITS CURRENT 36,000 ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL. CAPABILITIES HAVE BEEN UPGRADED MODESTLY THROUGH PROCUREMENT OF MODERN EQUIPMENT. (IMMEDIATE FUTURE MAJOR ITEMS FOCUS IS ON THE F-16 AIRCRAFT AND COAST GUARD SHIPS). A MAJOR PROCUREMENT PROBLEM FACES THE NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES IN THE 1980'S AS THE SHIPS AND EQUIPMENT ACQUIRED IN THE 1955-65 TIME PERIOD REACH OBSOLESCENCE. PROBABLY THE SINGLE MOST SIGNIFICANT CURRENT DEFICIENCY IS LACK OF ADEQUATE AIR FIELD DEFENSE CAPABILITY.

DESPITE A STRONG NATIONAL LOYALTY AND WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT TO PRESERVE THEIR INDEPENDENCE, THE NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES ARE INCAPABLE OF DEFENDING THEIR BORDERS, WITHOUT OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE AGAINST A MODERN, WELL EQUIPPED ENEMY.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 OSLO 03506 04 OF 05 240846Z

ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00

INR-10 NSAE-00 AID-05 ACDA-12 HA-05 EB-08 TRSE-00

OMB-01 H-01 /082 W

-----035206 240915Z /20

R 240620Z JUL 78

FM AMEMBASSY OSLO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6191

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

JCS WASHDC
CSA WASHDC
CNO WASHDC
CSAF WASHDC
CMC WASHDC
/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
DISAM WP AFB OH

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 5 OSLO 3506

FROM ODC

USCINCEUR FOR ECJ4/7-SA

AT BEST, THE NORWEGIANS COULD CONDUCT A LIMITED
DELAYING ACTION TO GAIN TIME FOR THE NATO ALLIES TO
COME TO THEIR AID.

3. A. (6) (S) IN THE PERIOD SINCE THE END OF
WORLD WAR II, NORWAY HAS DEDICATED A RELATIVELY
STABLE PROPORTION OF HER GNP TO NATIONAL DEFENSE.
HER EFFORT HAS VARIED BETWEEN THREE AND FIVE
PERCENT OVER THE ENTIRE PERIOD. HOWEVER, USING GNP
AS A MEASURE, NORWAY'S RECORD UNTIL 1978 NOT ONLY
CONSISTENTLY FELL BELOW THAT OF THE EUROPEAN NATO
ALLIES (NORTH AMERICA'S CONTRIBUTION WAS ALMOST
TWICE AS HIGH--OVER SIX PERCENT IN 1975) BUT OVER
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 OSLO 03506 04 OF 05 240846Z

THE SAME PERIOD NORWAY'S DEFENSE SPENDING AS A
PROPORTION OF GNP DROPPED 15 PERCENT WHILE THE
AVERAGE DROP FOR ALL EUROPEAN NATO COUNTRIES WAS
ONLY 8 PERCENT.

IN 1977 THE TOTAL NORWEGIAN DEFENSE BUDGET
AMOUNTED TO 1.04 BILLION DOLLARS (\$1 EQUALS 5.3
NORWEGIAN KRONER), WHICH REPRESENTED A
REAL INCREASE OVER THE PREVIOUS YEAR OF 3.35 PERCENT.
THE DEFENSE BUDGET IN 1977 REPRESENTED ABOUT 8.9
PERCENT OF TOTAL 1977 GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES, A
DECREASE OF .9 PERCENT FROM 1976. THE 1978 DEFENSE
BUDGET PROVIDED FOR EXPENDITURES TOTALING 1.28 BILLION
DOLLARS UP 11.2 PERCENT OVER THE 1977 BUDGET. THE
INCREASE WAS LARGELY ATTRIBUTABLE TO F-16 AND COAST
GUARD COSTS. THE INCREASE OVER THE 1977 BUDGET WAS
3.6 PERCENT EXCLUDING THE COAST GUARD APPROPRIATION.
THE DEFENSE SHARE OF THE NATIONAL BUDGET SIMILARLY
ROSE FROM 8.8 PERCENT IN 1977 TO 9.4 PERCENT
IN 1978, AND PERCENTAGE OF GNP FROM 2.9 PERCENT TO
3.1 PERCENT.

NORWAY AS ONE OF THE RICHEST MEMBERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE COULD WELL AFFORD TO SPEND MORE ON DEFENSE. HOWEVER, ITS HIGHLY DEVELOPED SOCIAL WELFARE SYSTEM IS A TREMENDOUS DRAIN ON THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. DEFENSE SUFFERS ALSO FROM A SMALL POPULATION AND LARGE TERRITORY TO DEFEND AT THE SAME TIME INFLATION AND HIGH LIVING STANDARD CAUSE NORWAY'S MILITARY PERSONNEL COSTS TO BE VERY HIGH. TOTAL IMPORTS IN 1977 AMOUNTED TO \$12,812,000,000 OF WHICH \$180,000,000 COULD BE IDENTIFIED AS MILITARY RELATED (\$110,000,000 SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 OSLO 03506 04 OF 05 240846Z

OF WHICH AS F-16 ASSOCIATED).

E.A. (7) (S) THIS PARAGRAPH IS ANSWERED BY THE FY 80-84 MSAP WHICH WAS SUBMITTED EARLIER THIS FISCAL YEAR.

3.A. (8) (S) SINCE NORWAY DOES NOT RECEIVE MAP, FMS FINANCING OR IMET, ALL ITEMS IN THE MSAP AND ADDRESSED IN THIS SUB-PARAGRAPH ARE FMS CASH ONLY. FOOTNOTES IN THE MSAP PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON PROJECTS. THE FOLLOWING LISTS INCLUDES MAJOR PROJECTS ONLY:

(A) F-16 - HIGHEST PRIORITY PURCHASE IN ORDER TO INCREASE AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES. ESSENTIAL PURCHASE AND MAJOR DEFENSE EXPENDITURE THRU 1983.

(B) ROLAND MISSILE- SECOND PRIORITY. WILL FURTHER INCREASE NORWAY'S AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY.

(C) AIM-9L/MAVERICK - THIRD PRIORITY. THESE PGMS ARE REQUIRED FOR THE NEW F-16'S AS OUTLINED IN THE MSAP.

(D) COAST GUARD HELICOPTERS -
-, 58:80-53\$
76 9* 6 QUOTE LAMPS UNQUOTE TYPE HELICOPTERS IN FY 80 TIME-FRAME MAY BE REDUCED TO 2 IN FY 80 AND THEN 4 MORE AFTER COMPLETION OF F-16 PURCHASES IN FY 83. THIS IS PART OF EFFORT TO ESTABLISH A VIABLE NORWEGIAN COAST GUARD.

(E) P3B NAV SYSTEMS- AN ESSENTIAL PURCHASE TO GIVE P3B'S THE NAVIGATIONAL CAPABILITIES REQUIRED TO OPERATE IN NORWEGIAN AIR-SPACE. PART

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 OSLO 03506 04 OF 05 240846Z

OF A CONTINUING EFFORT TO MODERNIZE THE P3B FLEET.

(F) STINGER - UNFUNDED BUT ANTICIPATED BUY IN
THE FY 82-84 TIME - FRAME TO INCREASE AIR DEFENSE
CAPABILITY.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 OSLO 03506 05 OF 05 240836Z

ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00
INR-10 NSAE-00 AID-05 ACDA-12 HA-05 EB-08 TRSE-00
OMB-01 H-01 /082 W

-----035160 240918Z /20

R 240620Z JUL 78

FM AMEMBASSY OSLO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6192

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

JCS WASHDC

CSA WASHDC

CNO WASHDC

CSAF WASHDC

CMC WASHDC

/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

DISAM WP AFB OH

S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 5 OSLO 3506

FROM ODC

USCINCEUR FOR ECJ4/7-SA

(D) PATRIOT- UNFUNDED BUT ANTICIPATED BUY
IN THE FY 83-85 TIME-FRAME TO INCREASE HIGH-
ALTITUDE AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY AND AS A REPLACEMENT
SYSTEM FOR NIKE.

3. A. (9) (S) THE F-16 IS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT
FMS PURCHASE BY NORWAY TO DATE. THE PROCUREMENT

BY NORWAY OF THIS AIRCRAFT COMPLETELY DOMINATES THE NORWEGIAN DEFENSE BUDGET THROUGH 1983 TO THE POINT THAT OTHER NECESSARY DEFENSE MATERIEL CANNOT BE PROCURED. IN RECOGNITION OF THE WEAKNESS IN THE AIR DEFENSE AREA, IT IS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE BUDGET SUBMISSIONS IN DECEMBER 1978 MAY RECOMMEND
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 OSLO 03506 05 OF 05 240836Z

ONE ADDITIONAL F-16 SQDN AND INCREASED ROLAND PURCHASES. SPARES AND AIRMAMENT FOR THE F-16'S IN THE FORM OF PGM'S (PRECISION GUIDED MISSILES), AIM-9L'S, MAVERICK'S, HARPOON'S AND OTHER AIR TO GROUND ORDINANCE WILL CONTINUE TO DOMINATE THE DEFENSE BUDGET THROUGH THE NEXT FIVE YEARS.

3. A. (10) (S) NORWAY'S RELATIONSHIPS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS SWEDEN, DENMARK, FINLAND AND THE USSR NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OR ESTABLISHING A LARGE NATO MILITARY BASE, OR A SIGNIFICANT BUILDUP OF NORWEGIAN OR ALLIED FORCES IN NORTHERN NORWAY, NO ARMS PURCHASE EITHER CONTEMPLATED OR IN PROCESS COULD AFFECT REGIONAL STABILITY. THE MAJOR PURCHASE AT THE MOMENT IS 72 F-16S TO REPLACE APPROX 100 OLDER TYPE AIRCRAFT. WHILE THE F-16 IS A MORE SOPHISTICATED AND CAPABLE AIRCRAFT, IT CANNOT BE VIEWED AS DESTABILIZING AS IT REPRESENTS A REPLACEMENT MODERNIZATION PROGRAM THAT MANY HAVE CRITICIZED BEING A NET DECREMENT IN CAPACITY. THE OTHER MAJOR PURCHASE NOW BEING CONSIDERED BY THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT IS THE ACQUISITION OF ROLAND II FOR AIRFIELD DEFENSE. THIS ALSO IS NOT AND COULD NOT BE SEEN AS DESTABILIZING.

3.A. (11) (S) NORWAY'S PERFORMANCE IN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE EXEMPLARY. HER HIGH REGARD FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS INCLUDING THE LIFE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY OF ITS OWN CITIZENS IS REFLECTED IN ITS DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEM GUARANTEEING A FULL RANGE OF SAFEGUARDS, PROVISIONS AND GUARANTEES. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ENVISAGE ANY SITUATION INVOLVING
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 OSLO 03506 05 OF 05 240836Z

ARMS PURCHASE WHERE NORWAY WOULD VIOLATE ANY HUMAN RIGHTS TENETS.

3. A. (13) (F) (S) THE AMBASSADOR'S POLICY ON
ODC STAFFING HAS BEEN SPELLED OUT IN A NUMBER OF
MESSAGES. THE POSITIONS CURRENTLY AUTHORIZED
(2 OFF, 1 EM, 1 DAC AND 2 FLS'S) REPRESENT THE
MAXIMUM HE DEEMS NECESSARY. HE IS PRESENTLY CONSIDER-
ING COMBINING THE ODC AND DAO SECTIONS WHICH COULD
IMPACT ON THE TOTAL NUMBER OF POSITIONS INVOLVED IN
SECURITY ASSISTANCE WORK.
LERNER

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SECURITY, FOREIGN RELATIONS, MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 24 jul 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978OSLO03506
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780303-0046
Format: TEL
From: OSLO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780727/aaaaawwc.tel
Line Count: 611
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 4832f96d-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION PM
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 12
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 STATE 167901, 78 STATE 978
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 28 apr 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1907995
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
TAGS: MASS, PGOV, NO, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/4832f96d-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014